The Trump/Putin bromance is based around shared values, not interests

The foreign leader who President-elect Donald Trump has done most to befriend and defend, both during the Presidential election and afterwards, is Russian dictator Vladamir Putin. This, like so much of what Trump has done, is unprecedented for a senior American politician. However it’s never been in his short-term interest to do so. Trump has been prepared to associate himself with Putin despite the hostility of the mainstream Republican Party, the American security establishment and the majority of the American people. This indicates that to Trump, this relationship matters, and matters enough to be worth taking a political hit for. In short Trump is allying with Putin not because it makes strategic sense, or is a geopolitical necessity, but because he sees in Putin a kindred spirit who shares his world view. This tells us a great deal, little of it comforting, about Trump’s likely foreign policy and attitude to governing.  

Trump’s admiration for Putin goes back a long way. In October 2007 he told CNN’s Larry King that Putin was ‘doing a great job rebuilding the image of Russia and also rebuilding Russia period’. In June 2013, ahead of a ‘Miss Universe Pagent” he organised in Moscow, Trump asked his followers on Twitter whether they thought Putin would be attending, and ‘if so, will he become my new best friend?’ The relationship developed after Trump became a serious contender for the Republican Presidential nomination, blossoming into one of mutual public praise. In December 2015 Putin described Trump as the ‘absolute leader in the Presidential race’ and ‘talented without doubt’. Trump swiftly showed his appreciation, stating that it was ‘a great honor to be so nicely complimented by a man so highly respected within his own country and beyond’ and later in the month defending Putin from accusations he had murdered political opponents.

During this time evidence that Russia was giving practical assistance to Trump’s campaign mounted. In particular security sources began suggesting that Russia was behind the hacking of internal Democratic National Committee emails, which were subsequently released by Wikileaks. Trump responded not by voicing concerns about a foreign power potentially interfering in the American electoral process, but by calling on Russia to hack and release Hillary Clinton’s emails as well. Even after his election, when it became clear that both the FBI and CIA believed Russia was behind the hacking, with the explicit intention of helping Trump, the President-elect continued to deny Russian involvement. When President Obama responded to the hacking allegations by expelling Russian diplomats, Trump praised Putin for the ‘Great move’ of not responding in kind, stating ‘I always knew he was very smart!’

Trump’s warm relationship with the Russian leader becomes starker still when we compare it to his attitude towards the leaders of a number of America’s closest allies, leaders who clearly adhere to liberal-democratic values. In December 2015 he accused German Chancellor Angela Merkel of ‘ruining Germany’, and Trump went on to tell Piers Morgan that he was unlikely to have a good relationship with then British Prime Minister David Cameron after he criticised Trump’s plan to ban Muslims from entering America. Trump’s rows with American allies show that his warmness towards Putin can’t be attributed to his unusually diplomatic nature, nor to some friendly and personable nature.

Trump’s friendly relationship with Putin has undoubtedly been politically damaging to him, showing how determined he has been to maintain it. It is one of the issues which has most strained his relationship with traditional Republican leaders, and especially the party’s foreign policy hawks. Indeed until recently Trump was virtually the only significant Republican advocating a closer relationship with Putin, whilst most of the party, and especially its right-wing, criticised Obama for being too weak in response to Russian aggression.

Putin is also unpopular amongst the American public, and until quite recently this overwhelmingly included supporters of the Republican Party. Trump has pretty much single-handedly affected a major change in attitudes to Putin amongst Republican support. Until recently he had a met approval amongst Republican voters of -66. Now it’s down to just -10, whilst the proportion of Republicans with a positive view of Trump has increased from 10% in 2014 to 37% this December. What’s clear is that it’s never really been in Trump’s interest to be so friendly towards Putin, showing that he’s done so for reasons of ideological conviction rather than self-interest. Trump’s relationships with the Republican leadership, and the American media and security establishment, have all been damaged by his affection towards Putin. Moreover it remains an unpopular position amongst the public, and despite a dramatic improvement in his ratings even a majority of Republican voters continue to hold negative views of Putin.

Trump has gone out of his way to praise Putin, despite the political damage this has caused him, because they see the world in the same way and share a similar value system. They both, in summary, subscribe to broadly the same ideology. Trump and Putin are both anti-liberal authoritarian nationalists. Both men believe that the culture and power of their respective countries is threatened by a combination of social liberalism and foreign influences (linked in America to immigration and in both countries to Islamic fundamentalism). Both wish to restore their nation to match an era of past-greatness, reflecting some combination of the Russian Empire and the USSR for Putin and the post-WWII period for Trump. In addition Trump and Putin both share an innate authoritarianism, a belief in their own indispensability to their respective nations and a questionable or hostile attitude towards democratic institutions and norms.

Putin and his allies have undermined Russia’s democratic institutions, which were admittedly already weak, to the point where democracy in Russia is clearly no more than a sham. Similarly during the Presidential election campaign Trump attacked or disregarded many of the norms of American democracy. He stated that his opponent should be imprisoned, argued that the election was rigged against him when it appeared he might lose and launched aggressive and continuous attacks on the media. His rhetoric was that of the standard demagogue, and if you change a few key words his speeches could have been delivered by a Latin American strongman or Central Asian dictator.

In summary Trump’s friendly attitude towards Putin isn’t the result of shared interests, or real politic, but because they share similar values. The two men have a very similar understanding of how power works, and how the world ought to be run, and as a result Trump has been prepared to associate himself with Putin despite the political damage this has caused him. This doesn’t necessarily mean Trump and Putin will always get on. 

Authoritarian nationalists have a tendency to fall out badly when their interests become incompatible.  But it does mean we should be wary of Trump’s intentions and sceptical of his interest in defending liberal-democratic values or America’s constitutional principles. I’ve advise American defenders of democracy to spend the next four years sleeping with one eye open.  

If you found this interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter: @JBickertonUK

The world can’t afford a return to great power politics

The stability of the liberal-democratic (or Western) world order is currently held together by a complex set of international organisations. Broadly speaking all these bodies promote, or at least aim to promote, free market economics, international cooperation, representative democracy and conflict avoidance. But these international organisations are rapidly losing influence and popular support. As a result there are signs that an older system of international relations is re-emerging, one based more around naked national self-interest and great power rivalry. Considering the destructive power that humanity currently possesses, and the history of conflict associated with great power rivalries, this is at best a dangerous development. At worst, it could be cataclysmic.

The organisations which uphold the current world order include, but are not limited to, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), NATO, the European Union (EU) and (to a limited extent) the United Nations (UN). The IMF, WTO and World Bank promote market economics, free trade and fiscal prudence. NATO and similar alliances, such as the ANZUS alliance (between Australia, New Zealand and the United States), provide security for the liberal-democratic world, primarily by committing the United States to protect its other members. The EU has promoted both market economics and liberal-democracy in Europe, particularly the South and East of the continent, whilst the UN acts as a forum to resolve international disputes, though as several authoritarian countries have veto power its influence is quite limited.

Some of the organisations listed above work better than others. Several of them are deeply flawed. But what they all have in common is that they’re losing influence in the face of a nationalist backlash. This backlash may be partly justified. You don’t have to be a hard-line nationalist to be uncomfortable about the wealth and influence of the ‘Davos elite’, nor to be concerned about the failure of mainstream Western politicians to address concerns relating to identity, immigration and national security. When I look at the behaviour of the EU over the last few years it’s hard not to conclude that some of its leaders are closet UKIP supporters.

As a result it’s perhaps unsurprising that the current liberal-democratic world order is starting to come apart at the seams. Most significantly the United States, which underwrites and protects much of this order, has just elected a President who doesn’t believe in liberal-democratic values in any meaningful sense of the term. He violated several basic democratic norms, by suggesting that he might not accept the election result if he lost, vowing to imprison his opponent and launching unusually aggressive attacks on the media. He also made it clear that he has little respect for the international bodies which support and protect liberal-democratic values. During the election campaign he said that as President he might not protect NATO members who hadn’t ‘fulfilled their obligations to us’, attacked free trade deals (and by association international capitalism) as impoverishing American workers and associated himself with a number of authoritarian leaders. His primary foreign policy pledge was to put ‘America First’, rather than to promote liberal-democratic values. Under Trump America is likely to surrender her role as chief defender of the liberal-democratic world order, and pursue an increasingly nationalistic policy instead.

Other pillars of the international order are also in trouble. The EU is virtually paralysed. Britain has voted to leave, the populist right is gaining support across the continent, the Eurozone continues to struggle with several of its members stagnating and Governments in Eastern Europe resist many of its dictates. Meanwhile the international financial order has yet to recover from the hit its credibility took during the 2008 recession, whilst the UN remains as impotent as ever. Given the decline of these institutions, and the rise of nationalism across the planet, it’s not difficult to imagine a different world order emerging. This would be characterised by the interactions between self-interested nation states. This would hardly be new, on the contrary it’s the way human societies have behaved for most of recorded history. But it has never before been so dangerous.

To put it bluntly a global order based on competing nation states is almost certainly going to trigger significant wars. We know this both because of our history, and because it logically makes sense. The current period of peace and stability in the liberal-democratic world is almost unprecedented in terms of its longevity. Comparable periods of regional stability have tended to be imposed from above by empires. If the current world order collapses, and is replaced by one of self-interested nation states, then it’s inevitable that the interests of these states will at times conflict. Sometimes it will clearly be in the interest of one power to pursue a military solution, if it believes the odds are in its favour. Other times the push of tribal nationalism, and fear of losing face, may lead authoritarian leaders to gamble on wars they know they could lose.

What makes this scenario so dangerous, rather than just a repeat of past history, is that human destructive power is so much greater than ever before. Nine countries are at present nuclear armed, and this number is likely to rise if the current world order disintegrates. With the present level of human technology nuclear weapons are relatively easy to deliver, extremely destructive, and very difficult to stop. The threat of mutually assured destruction makes wars between major powers less likely than in the past, but in my view far from impossible. In short if there is a dramatic increase in the level of inter-state conflict, as seems likely if a world order based on great power politics is reconstructed, then it’s likely that at some point nuclear weapons will be used.

Since 1945 the liberal-democratic world, originally concentrated in North America and Western Europe, has developed a complex set of institutions designed to avert war, promote liberal-democratic government and advance market economics. Over time the influence of these institutions spread along with the liberal-democratic form of Government, especially with the end of the Cold War, so that by 2010 they covered new areas such as Eastern Europe and much of the Asia-Pacific region. However nationalism is currently on the rise. With Trump in America, Modi in India, Xi Jinping in China and Putin in Russia we have leaders who would be comfortable with a return to great power politics. They could plausibly be joined in the next year by France’s Marine le Pen, in which case Britain would be the only permanent member of the UN Security Council not to be ruled by an authoritarian nationalist.

As the institutions and norms which have underwritten the liberal-democratic world since after WWII start to weaken, it’s worth considering the alternative. A world order based on great power politics. Combined with the destructive power of modern weaponry this is a frightening prospect. It cannot reasonably be compared with previous eras of conflict, which never threatened the survival of humanity itself. Thus, whilst they may be ugly and imperfect, it is worth protecting the institutions which underwrite the current liberal-democratic world order. 

If you found this interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter: @JBickertonUK

Labour’s Brexit dilemma

On quite possibly the most important issue facing our country, restructuring our political and economic relations with Europe after the Brexit vote, the Labour Party lacks a coherent policy. When you consider Labour’s electoral coalition this is understandable, but it is also potentially very damaging. Labour’s problem is that it’s traditional electoral base, a coalition of traditionally working class (disproportionately public sector), liberal/leftist middle-class and ethnic minority voters is hopelessly split on Brexit, and the associated issue of immigration. Generally speaking working-class voters were more likely to vote for Brexit, with income as well as age being a strong indicator of how someone voted in the referendum, whilst the middle-class liberals voted ‘Remain’. Labour’s challenge is to find a position on Brexit which holds this coalition together, and is logically coherent.

So far they have failed to do so. Labour’s current Brexit policy is, essentially, to mumble some general platitudes and then try and change the subject. But considering how important Brexit will be as an issue over the next few years, this isn’t good enough. Labour risks alienating both its ‘Remain’ and ‘Leave’ voting supporters. Rather than being the party of the 52% or the 48%, it could become the party of the 0%. The Liberal Democrats are, unsurprisingly, presenting themselves as the anti-Brexit party. So far this is working well for them; they’ve hit 14% in the opinion polls, taken the Richmond Park parliamentary seat from a renegade Tory and roughly doubled their share of the vote in the recent Sleaford and North Hykeham by-election. On the other side the Conservative Party has remodelled itself as the party of ‘sensible’ Brexit, though it remains divided on what concessions should be made for single market access, whilst UKIP remains the party of ‘hard’ Brexit.

In these circumstances, if the impact of Brexit is a major issue at the next general election (as is likely) it’s not clear who Labour will appeal to. They are currently polling at an abysmal 29%, and have a leader whose approval rating matches that of various tropical diseases. Labour performs best when the main political issue is the distribution of wealth within society. When this gets replaced by issues related to identity the party struggles. In Scotland, after independence replaced economics as the main political division after the 2014 referendum, support for the Scottish Labour Party collapsed. In the 2015 UK General Election they lost 40 of their 41 seats, and in 2016 they were replaced by the Conservatives as the official opposition in the Scottish Parliament. The SNP, as the party of Scottish nationalism, got the support of previously Labour voters who voted ‘Yes’ in 2014. Correspondingly the Scottish Conservatives branded themselves as the assertive party of the union, and got an increased share of the unionist vote. As a result Scottish Labour was squeezed out.

The risk for Labour is that what happened in Scotland could be replicated, to some extent, across the rest of the UK. If Brexit, and associated identity issues like immigration, become the main cleavage in British politics the party could lose support to rivals with a clearer and firmer position on both sides. Broadly speaking it will lose ‘Remain’ voters to the Liberal Democrats, and ‘Leave’ supporters to the Conservatives and possibly UKIP. An interesting test will come with the Copeland by-election, after sitting Labour MP Jamie Reed decided he had a better chance of getting close to power in the nuclear energy industry rather than the Parliamentary Labour Party. The Conservatives are currently the bookies favourite to win the seat, which has been Labour since it was first contested in 1983. If they do so, and the Liberal Democrats increase their share of the vote, it will be a clear indication that the Labour Party really is in trouble. The Labour Party needs a position on Brexit which is both consistent and firm. At present it has neither, and it looks likely to start paying the price.  

If you found this interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter: @JBickertonUK

#MakeConservatismGreatAgain – we can’t allow our ideology to be defined by Donald Trump

For the next four years Donald J. Trump, as President of the United States, will be the most influential and high-profile conservative in the world. This, for conservatism as a whole, is a disaster. For humanity as a whole of course it could be even worse, but plenty has been written on this already by more able writers. If Trump’s brand of authoritarian, prejudice and quasi-democratic politics is allowed to define and transform the conservative movement then this movement will no longer be a positive force in world politics. This means the next four years are going to see an intense battle, most pronounced in America, for control of the conservative brand and party apparatus. It’s a battle which ‘traditional’ conservatives, by which I mean those who subscribe to liberal-democratic-capitalist values, must win over their authoritarian and populist rivals. And it’s a battle that’s going to be fought within the conservative movement, and often within political parties, between politicians who may until recently have considered each other allies.

The first thing ‘moderate’ conservatives need to do, and I’ll use this term throughout to refer to those who prioritise liberal-democratic values, is to realise that some of our greatest adversaries are on ‘our’ side. Politics isn’t, and shouldn’t be seen as, left vs right. In Britain the centre-left found this out the hard way. They indulged the hard-left, sharing platforms and the Labour Party with the defenders of Castro and Venezuela (and more curiously Hamas and Hezbullah), until the hard-left took over. Only at this point did they recognise that the hard-left were more than harmless eccentrics trying to flog unreadable newspapers outside party conference, they had the potential to be a mortal threat.

The fate of the Republican Party in America mirrors Labour in the UK. The moderates spent years indulging, or at least refusing to fight, the hard-right. They thought they needed the votes of the hard right, of evangelical conservatives, economic nationalists and tea party fruitcakes, in order to beat the Democrats. They may well have been right. But as a result, especially during the Obama years, they allowed the hard-right to become more and more entrenched within the American conservative movement until, via Trump, they were able to takeover.  

Mainstream Republicans began by tolerating, or turning a blind eye to, all kinds of quackish nonsense and insanity. The hard-right spread racially charged rumours that Obama wasn’t born in America, that there was a plot to repeal the 2^nd amendment and even shut down the federal Government in 2013. Overtime the right gained strength, making increasingly implicit appeals to white identity politics, until the mainstream Republican candidates were wiped out in the 2016 Primaries. In the end the Republican choice came down to Ted Cruz, the ultra-conservative ideologue, or Donald Trump, the populist demagogue. The Republican Party is dominated by Trump now, and moderate Republicans need to fight hard to ensure that at least some residue of the original Republican Party survives.

The same battles will also be fought in Europe. Generally in Europe the demarcation lines are clearer, as the hard-right and mainstream conservatives have different parties. Thus the hard-right, represented by Trump in America, is represented in Europe by the likes of the Front National in France and the Freedom Parties of Austria and the Netherlands. Generally European conservatives, no doubt reflecting on their history, have been better at confronting the hard-right than their American counterparts. This may be partly why, outside of Eastern Europe, the hard-right has been kept away from power on the continent. Considering the strength of the hand the right has been handed, thanks to economic stagnation, the refugee crisis and Islamist terrorism, this is no mean feat. But it’s unlikely to last. The hard-right is likely to triumph in some West European nation in the near future. They nearly managed it twice this year in Austria, with the Freedom Party candidate coming within a narrow margin of winning the Presidency. They will have another chance next year, with Parliamentary elections in the Netherlands (and possibly Italy) and, most significantly, the French Presidential election.

Considering the threat from the hard-right, who are currently far more of a threat to the Western order than the hard-left, moderate conservatives have a duty to fight on their right flank as well as the left. They should be wary of seeing authoritarian populists as useful allies against the left, and should prioritise liberal-democratic values and defence of the nation over any allegiance to a broader ‘conservative’ family. If at times this means working with parties of the centre and centre-left, then so be it. And moderate conservatives need to realise that, right now, history doesn’t seem to be moving in their direction.  

If you found this interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter: @JBickertonUK

The great divide in Western conservatism

The Atlantic recently published an excellent piece by Professor Peter Beinart, discussing the divisions within the American Republican party over policy towards Russia. It makes a distinction between ‘ideological’ conservatives, primarily loyal to liberal-democratic values, and ‘civilizational’ conservatives, who prioritise the defence of Judeo-Christian culture and civilisation. The former, which include the likes of George W. Bush, Mitt Romney and John McCain, tend to be suspicious of Russia and other countries with authoritarian leaders, and desire to spread the liberal-democratic form of government around the world. The latter group, which contains figures like President-elect Donald Trump and his chief strategist Steve Bannon, are primarily interested in defending ‘Western’ culture and civilisation from external threats, chiefly ‘radical Islam’ (or Islam itself), and see Russia under Putin as an ally in this struggle.

Professor Beinart’s analysis can, I think, be expanded beyond the American Republican party to cover Western conservatism in general. Admittedly this is not a totally fresh perspective. It has long been argued that conservatives can be divided between populists and free-market liberals. Between ‘nationalists’ and ‘globalists’. This analysis may be somewhat simplistic, but it is also extremely useful.

All Western conservatives want to preserve and enhance Western civilisation. But there is a key disagreement on what constitutes the core of this civilisation. For ‘ideological’ conservatives, who were until quite recently the overwhelmingly dominant body, its liberal-democratic values. They attribute the success of Western nations to democratic institutions and practices, the rule of law and market economics. They also tend to believe, at least to some extent, that these values are potentially universal and exportable, and thus often favour an interventionist foreign policy. By contrast ‘civilizational’ conservatives define Western civilisation primarily in cultural terms, with Judeo-Christian values at its core. This is usually combined with a dose of nativist nationalism, and sometime (as in the case of Trump) with some focus on white identity politics. Civilizational conservatives tend to be much more suspicious of foreign influences, which could erode their countries Judeo-Christian values, and are correspondingly less interested in foreign interventions unless undertaken in naked self-interest.

Until quite recently ‘ideological’ conservatism was so dominant within the mainstream conservative movement, or its elite at any rate, that those who adhered to ‘civilizational’ conservatism could largely be ignored or dismissed as cranks and bigots. This is no longer the case. As someone who believes the core of Western civilisation is liberal-democratic values and institutions, making me an ‘ideological’ conservative, the revival of this rival breed of conservatism over the past couple of years has been something of a shock. Over the next few years, it could well become rather more than this.

The revival of ‘civilizational’ conservativism has many parents, and has been going on, partially hidden from view, for longer than a lot of people realise. For some time now a significant section of the public, in both Europe and America, have clearly been concerned with the level of cultural change taking place due to immigration. The ‘ideological’ right, like the centre-left, have largely failed to address this concern. Both are fundamentally pro-immigration, and less concerned about cultural change. For the left this is primarily due to internationalist principles and a belief in individual rights. For the ideological right immigration is seen as useful to business, and is supported on free market principles. In addition the ideological right belief that liberal-democratic values are universalist means they tend to believe that immigrant communities can be integrated into Western societies with relative ease.

The civilizational right disagree. They are suspicious of immigrant communities’ ability to assimilate into Judeo-Christian civilisation, and so tend to view substantial migrant flows as a threat. And like it or not, and on the whole I don’t, a significant proportion of the general public agrees with them. Meaning that views which were once on the fringe of conservatism have moved into the mainstream.

We can see the rise of ‘civilizational’ conservatism across the West. Most prominently it has recently triumphed in America, with the election of Donald Trump running on explicitly anti-Hispanic and Islamic immigration platform, and promising to promote Judeo-Christian culture (and attacking anything which seeks to undermine this as ‘political correctness’). The picture is similar in Europe. Civilizational conservative parties (usually described as ‘populists’) are gaining ground across the continent. In Eastern Europe they are already in Government in both Poland and Hungary, with the governments of both countries portraying the 2015 refugee surge from the Middle East as a threat to Christendom.

In Western Europe the situation is similar, with civilizational conservative parties topping polls in France, Austria and the Netherlands in recent months. Even in the UK civilizational conservatism has seen a resurgence, with some (though far from all) ‘Leave’ campaigners making explicit reference to it during the EU referendum debate. The focus on Turkey joining the EU for example, was clearly responding to concerns which go quite a bit beyond raw numbers. My personal experience when campaigning during the referendum was that, for a section of ‘Leave’ voters, the vote became a change to voice their displeasure at the level of cultural and demographic change which has taken place in the past 30-40 years. More free-market orientated ‘ideological’ conservatives would be mad to ignore this. 

In short ‘civilizational’ conservatism has made a strong resurgence in recent years, in response to immigration levels and associated cultural change, and could well grow further in the next few years. More traditional conservatives such as myself, as well as the left, need to recognise and acknowledge these concerns, or risk being swept away by them. There is no shortage of ideologies in the dustbin of history. We need to make sure ours isn’t next.

If you found this piece interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter @JBickertonUK. 

After Trump’s election who is the new leader of the free world?

Since 1945 the unofficial title of ‘leader of the free world’ (free meaning liberal-democratic) has essentially belonged to the President of the United States of America. Following the election of Donald Trump as America’s next President last month, this is now in doubt. To be clear Trump could still lead the ‘free world’. But this would require him to govern in a quite different style, and with different policies, from those he pursued during the Presidential election campaign. During this campaign Trump questioned his commitment to a number of the key components of the liberal-democratic order. He suggested that his commitment to European security via NATO is incomplete, was openly friendly towards a number of autocratic leaders and suggested that Japan and South Korea should be less reliant on America for defence. He also refused to observe a number of the basic tenants of a democratic society, asserting that the election was rigged against him whenever it looked like he might lose and attacking certain journalists/media organisations with an unusual ferocity.

To lead the free world Trump would have to reassert his own commitment to the tenants of democratic government, and make it clear that America is still intends to protect the liberal-democratic order. It is far from clear that he is prepared to do this. So far, the signs are mixed at best. Admittedly Trump did appear to reassert America’s commitment to Asian security after a meeting with the Japanese Prime Minister, and to NATO during a telephone call with British Prime Minister Theresa May. But it’s too early to say if these commitments are secure, and Trump has continued to conduct himself in an authoritarian manner (for example launching strident attacks on TV show Saturday Night Live for mocking him, and the cast of Hamilton for lecturing his Vice-President). So if Trump elects not to lead the free world, what other candidates are available? Below I will go through the possible alternatives, and state which I think is most likely. The candidates are as follows:

Angela Merkel – Chancellor of Germany

Strengths: An experienced and respected politician, who had led her country since 2005. She is undoubtedly committed to liberal-democratic values and the Western order, and notably when congratulating Trump on his victory made explicit reference to her belief in ‘democracy, freedom and respect for the law’. Germany has the fourth biggest economy in the world, and is the most influential power within both the Eurozone and the European Union. Obama recently described Merkel as his ‘closest international partner’ and his recent visit to Bavaria was interpreted by some as passing on the liberal-democratic baton to Merkel.  

Weaknesses: Germany isn’t a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and doesn’t possess nuclear weapons. Moreover since 1945 Germany has behaved as a European, rather than world, power and its influence on events outside of Europe has been limited. Germany’s military capacity is weaker than the size of its economy would suggest, and due to the country’s history the German establishment and people are deeply reluctant to resort to armed force or deploy their military outside of Europe. Moreover German attention is currently focused on protecting the European Union and the Eurozone, and also on contending with the mass influx of (predominantly Syrian) refugees which took place in 2015.

Theresa May – Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Strengths: The UK is the fifth biggest economy in the world, with the world’s fifth highest military spending and second largest overseas aid budget. The county has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, is nuclear armed, and has both the capacity to, and a long history of, deploying military force around the world. Theresa May’s position as Prime Minister seems secure, and is unlikely to be challenged from within her own party any time soon, whilst the Conservatives enjoy double digit leads over the divided Labour opposition in opinion polls. In addition the UK’s soft/cultural power receives a substantial boost as the country speaks the world’s dominant language, English and the UK retains close relations with some of its former colonies.

Weaknesses: The UK recently alienated most of its liberal-democratic allies in Europe by voting to leave the European Union, and at present reformulating Britain’s political and economic relations with Europe dominates the thinking of British politicians and administrators. Following costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan support for engaging in future ground conflicts outside of Europe is questionable, and despite high levels of defence spending Britain’s military remains small in personnel terms. Britain’s economic strength, whilst strong, is considerably behind that of Japan and Germany. In addition British Government’s face an ongoing threat from Scottish nationalism, and from Islamic fundamentalism which has the potential to destabilize the UK’s political system by triggering a nationalist backlash.

Shinzō Abe – Prime Minister of Japan

Strengths: Japan is, by some margin, the third largest economy in the world. The country has a population of 127 million, around double that of Britain or France, giving it a considerable reserve of human capital. Japan is politically stable, with no obvious internal threats to its liberal-democratic system or serious secessionist movements. 

Weaknesses: Japan’s primary weakness is military, though it has the economic strength to resolve this if the political will exists to do so. Article 9 of the country’s constitution makes it very difficult to deploy the country’s military outside of Japan, and prior to this Article being amended in 2014 is was close to impossible. Moreover Japan is not nuclear armed, isn’t a permanent member of the UN Security Council and has relatively little track record of expanding its influence beyond Asia. In addition it remains somewhat culturally distinct to the rest of the Western world (which is more European influenced), and this may impact on its ability to form alliances.

François Hollande – President of France

Strengths: France has the sixth largest economy in the world (effectively joint fifth), has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and plays an important role within the European Union and Eurozone. In addition France has a substantial military capacity, including nuclear weapons, and a track record of deploying its forces around the world. France maintains significant influence in a number of its former colonies, and also possesses substantial soft/cultural power.

Weaknesses: Hollande’s ratings are spectacularly bad, with approval of as little as 4% according to a recent poll, and he’s announced he won’t be standing in the 2017 French Presidential election. There is a serious possibility that the Front National, an authoritarian nationalist party, could win the 2017 Presidential election and the French radical right is far stronger than in comparable European countries like Germany or the UK. France is also suffering from a stagnating economy, and faces a particularly severe problem from Islamic fundamentalists (which in turn increases the threat from the far-right).

Narendra Modi – Prime Minister of India

Strengths: India is by some margin the largest democracy in the world by population, with over 1.2 billion citizens, and looks secure. The Indian economy is already the seventh largest in the world, and is growing at a rate of around 7% per year, far above the rate in Europe or North America. India has a significant military capability, including nuclear weapons, and has a large diaspora around the world with some allegiance to the Indian state.

Weaknesses: India has historically focused its influence on South Asia, and has a limited global reach. In addition it borders a hostile nuclear armed power, Pakistan, and contains significant religious and ethnic divisions which could be exploited by an opponent. Furthermore whilst his attitude towards democratic norms can’t fairly be compared to Trump’s, Modi does subscribe to a form of Hindu nationalism which has clear authoritarian leanings.

Justin Trudeau – Prime Minister of Canada

Strengths: Justin Trudeau has, since his election, become an icon for the global liberal-left. Canada has the tenth biggest economy in the world, as well as a serious military capability which it has previously deployed around the world. In addition Canada gains from largely speaking the world’s dominant language, boosting its soft power and potentially allowing it to function as an English speaking counterpoint to an authoritarian United States.

Weaknesses: The small size of Canada’s population, at around 35 million, and her relative economic weakness versus other major powers significantly limits Canadian influence. In addition Canada does not possess nuclear weapons, and is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Canada’s military, whilst significant, is weaker than that of other major powers and Trudeau has been reluctant to support their use abroad, withdrawing Canada from the military coalition against Islamic State. Canada is also the nation most integrated in terms of culture and economy with the United States, meaning the country will need to retain cordial relations with President Trump, whilst there is a significant and longstanding separatist movement in Quebec.

Conclusion

When I go through the list of alternative ‘leaders of the free world’, other than the President of the United States, I’m struck by how reliant the liberal-democratic world has become on America for protection and leadership. This made the liberal-democratic world very vulnerable to any dramatic shift in the character of American domestic politics, as happened with the election of Donald Trump last month. Realistically, no liberal-democratic world leader, other than the American President, is strong enough to lead the ‘free world’ alone. Thus if Trump’s commitment to the security of the liberal-democratic world, and Western values in general, turns out to be incomplete a new alliance of liberal-democratic leaders will be required to protect and preserve the Western world. This is likely to embrace representatives from all of the above countries, unless France elects a Front National President, and many others.

However a particular duty to provide liberal-democratic leadership will fall to the leaders of Germany, Japan, Britain, India and (again assuming the Front National don’t take control) France. All of these countries have either a very substantial economic base, a strong international influence including a potent military or both. Germany will need to provide de-facto leadership of Europe, especially on economic questions, whilst European security will disproportionately be the responsibility of Britain and France. In this context it’s worth noting that if Le Pen wins the 2017 French Presidential election Britain will be both the only European nuclear armed power, and the only permanent member of the UN Security Council, not to be governed by an authoritarian nationalist. 

Japan, along with regional powers such as South Korea and Australia, will need to play a greater role in ensuring security in East Asia, and so far as possible they should persuade Trump to maintain a strong American presence in this area. One of the most important countries for the future of liberal-democracy, regardless of how Trump behaves, will be India. India is already the world’s largest democracy, and it’s rapidly growing economy and huge population mean the country is likely to have a substantially bigger global role in the future. If India retains its commitment to liberal-democratic values the country could become one of the key pillars of the international order, assuming it’s prepared to expand its influence and cooperate more with European and far-Eastern powers. If not, we’re all in trouble. Other than America itself I suspect India will be the most important player in the future of liberal-democracy as a system of government.

If you found this piece interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter @JBickertonUK. 

The election of Donald Trump is a final warning for liberal Europe

Liberal Europe has had quite a few warnings now – signals that all is not well and the populous are not content. The strong performance of hard-right parties in the 2014 European Parliament elections. The near victory of the Austrian Freedom Party’s Norbert Hofer in the (to be rerun) Austrian Presidential election last May. And most spectacularly the Brexit vote which was registered on 23 June. Liberal Europe should have woken up by this point, and to some extent changed course, but it has failed to do so. The election of Donald Trump as President of America last week should be seen as another, perhaps final, warning. Mainstream European politicians need to start addressing their voters’ concerns on a number of issues, particularly related to identity and immigration, or they risk oblivion. And so far, with some exceptions, they show little sign of doing so.

Donald Trump’s victory has far bigger implications than a standard American Presidential election. It was a revolutionary event. And as a conservative I tend to be suspicious of revolutionary events. During the campaign Trump appealed, fairly openly, to white identity politics. Not necessarily white nationalism, or indeed racism, but certainly to a racialized discourse. And it worked, allowing Trump to secure the Republican nomination, and then helping, or at least not preventing, his election as President. He promised to build a ‘big beautiful’ wall along America’s Southern border, to keep out Mexicans and other Hispanics, many of whom according to Trump were rapists and criminals. He pledged to deport 11 million undocumented migrants, and to remove Syrian refugees from the United States. And, for a time, he said he would ban Muslims from entering the United States.

The subtext of Trump’s commitments was probably more important than their actual content. America has been undergoing significant ethnic and cultural change. In 2014 for the first time more minority babies were born than non-Hispanic whites. For some white Americans this is clearly a source of discomfort. And Trump’s unstated promise, when you combine his commitments, is to keep ‘traditional’ (read largely white) America strong. The mistake that liberals made, and I largely include myself in this category, was to assume that the economy trumps everything. This is usually the case, but not always. And in 2016 it wasn’t the economy stupid. Brexit and Trump’s election show that for many voters issues around identity can also be decisive. During the Brexit debate the ‘Remain’ campaign enjoyed a consistent poll lead on the economy, whilst the ‘Leave’ campaign was significantly ahead on immigration. And the ‘Leave’ campaign won. Liberals have underestimated the power of issues related to identity, and for our sake this needs to stop now.

The revolution which has taken place in America could easily be replicated in Europe. And considering that Europe is more divided, unstable and threatened than America the results could well be more destructive. There is a good chance that a far-right party will either form part of the Government, or provide the head of state, for a Western or Central European country over the next year. This could happen as soon as 4 December, when the hard-right Freedom Party candidate has a decent chance of winning the Austrian Presidential election. If not Geert Wilder’s Freedom Party is currently polling strongly for the Dutch general election on 15 March 2017, though it’s exceptionally unlikely to win outright. Most significantly Marine Le Pen has a real change of being elected French President in May 2017. If Le Pen wins it would explode the Western European post-war consensus. The EU and Eurozone would be crippled, perhaps to the point of disintegration, whilst NATO would be undermined. For the first time since 1945 France and Germany could plausibly become hostile powers.

So given the severity of the crisis we potentially face what should European liberals do? Firstly we should acknowledge that the impact of immigration is more than just economic. It’s also cultural, and for better or worse can have a significant impact on the feel and sense of community of an area. As immigrants tend to be poor they are more likely to settle in less wealthy areas, so we should also recognise that the cultural impact of immigration falls disproportionately on the working class. This is why the notion that Western states are dominated by an unrepresentative liberal elite has become so potent, and was used so effectively by Trump and Brexit campaigners. The image of liberals, who benefit from the way mass migration suppresses wages in certain professions, and whose experience of immigration is primarily more exotic restaurants on the high street, is an exaggeration rather than a fantasy. And, when combined with the way a section of the liberal-intelligentsia dismisses any concerns about immigration and/or cultural change as bigotry, it’s easy to appreciate why this has caused a backlash.

European liberals should look at the election of Trump, as well as the growing popularity of the radical right in Europe, and realise that they need to change. They need to be more responsive to concerns about immigration, and acknowledge that the impact of immigration is more than just economic. And they need to pray to God that it’s not already too late, and that the tidal-wave of public anger can be assuaged before it starts undermining liberal-democracy itself. 

If you found this piece interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter @JBickertonUK. 

The election of Donald Trump just torpedoed the case for Scottish independence

The election of Donald J. Trump as President of America last Tuesday was a revolutionary event. Unless he totally abandons the policies and persona that got him election, which seems unlikely, 2016 could well be remembered along with the likes of 1917, 1929 and 1989 as a transformative year in human history. The implications of having an American President who doesn’t fully conform (or at least pretend to conform) to liberal-democratic principles are vast. America is, by some margin, the most powerful liberal-democratic state in the world. She spends significantly more on defence than the other 27 NATO members combined, and much of the liberal-democratic world has become reliant to some extent on America for protection. As a result there isn’t a country on the planet that isn’t profoundly affected by political developments in America. If America sneezes the rest of the free world gets flu. And America might be about to deliver a monumental sneeze.

The implications of a Trump Presidency are so enormous that I can’t possibly hope to address them all in one article. I lack both the time and the ability to do so. As a result I want to focus on one impact of Trump’s election, which has been to severely weaken the case for Scotland leaving the United Kingdom. I should confess at this point that I’m a strident unionist, for emotional as well as economic reasons. I’ve always felt that the case for Scotland remaining part of the UK was strong, if somewhat weakened by June’s Brexit vote, but now it’s become overwhelming. And primarily because of an issue what barely featured in the 2014 referendum campaign, the security of the British Isles.

The security of Western Europe is less assured than at any time since the fall of the USSR, and probably for quite some time before that. Western Europe has relied on America for defence since 1945 and, if Trump follows through on his campaign rhetoric, this can no longer be relied upon. During a New York Times interview, published on 20 July, Trump wouldn’t commit to defending NATO members who hadn’t ‘fulfilled their obligations to us’. Certainly it’s true that NATO’s European members have become dangerously complacent, with only four NATO members other than the United States spending the recommended 2% of GDP on defence (Britain, Poland, Greece and Estonia). When we combine this with Trump’s personal warmth towards Russian President Putin, and other authoritarian leaders, it’s far from clear that Europe can continue to rely on American protection. As a result European states need to be able to defend themselves, and the regional order, and most are not clearly able to do so.

So what does this have to do with Scotland? Scotland at present forms part, in many ways a crucial part, of one of the only liberal-democratic European states which does have a potent military, and therefore is able to uphold the regional order. The United Kingdom. Of the states of liberal-democratic Europe the most powerful militaries are possessed by Britain and France, who are also the only states in this region to be nuclear armed. As a result by virtue of forming part of the UK Scotland is effectively protected, and is also able to play an important role in defending the liberal-democratic order across Europe. If America retreats from the defence of Europe the strain will have to be taken, initially at least, by Britain, France and to some extent Germany. And considering the serious possibility that Le Pen could win next year’s French Presidential election, France can’t be considered completely reliable.  The only plausible alternative, some form of European Union army, seems too weak and unlikely (and the risk of the EU imploding is not insubstantial). Thus the disintegration of the UK would be a disaster not just for the British Isles, but for the security of Europe as a whole.

The stakes in world politics have got dramatically higher over the past week. The first duty of any Government is the security of its people, and for the first time in an era this is seriously threatened in liberal-democratic Europe. The British union has been extremely successful from a security point of view. Britain has been kept safe from invasion and ground conflict, and therefore somewhat shielded from the butchery which has taken place on the European continent. This protection has been brought by the English, Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish standing together as Britons, and now would be a particularly foolish moment to throw this security away.  

If you found this piece interesting you might like to follow me on Twitter @JBickertonUK. 

Once again our Union is in peril – the fight to protect it starts now

The British union, one of the most successful political unions in human history, is once again in danger. This is a shame, partly because it’s so unnecessary. It was, I’m afraid, always likely that a Brexit vote would reopen the debate about Scotland’s place within the UK. Clear enough that Boris Johnson, one of the chief architects of the leave vote, noted that it was a risk in the piece he penned but did not publish supporting a remain vote. But we are where we are. The case for Scotland remaining part of the UK may be marginally weaker than it was on 22 June, but it’s still overpoweringly strong. The SNP Government has published a draft Bill for a second independence referendum. They are positioning themselves so that, if the opinion polls turn as Brexit starts to bite, they are ready for a second referendum. And this means unionists need to be ready as well.

To be blunt I think that preserving the British union is the most important challenge Theresa May’s Government faces. If the union collapses on their watch they will be remembered for little else (assuming they don’t decide to nuke Moscow). It’s more important even than getting a decent Brexit deal, though I suspect the two are closely related. Indeed, if it’s clear that a hard-Brexit would break the union, I think there would be a strong case for a second referendum on Britain’s EU membership. The impact of Brexit on Scottish nationalism wasn’t much discussed during the referendum, and if Brexit is about to end the union there would be a strong democratic case for a second referendum to ask if this is a price people are willing to pay.

In retrospect it’s pretty clear that many unionists were, at least initially, complacent about the 2014 referendum. Support for independence had long hovered around 30%. As a result the British Government, whilst not desiring a referendum, saw it as a way of shutting down the question for a generation. They allowed the nationalists to draft a wording favourable to themselves, asking ‘Should Scotland be an independent country’ rather than ‘should Scotland remain part of the United Kingdom’. They also allowed then to tinker with the electorate, giving the vote to 16 and 17 year olds who the SNP were convinced leaned towards independence. The result, 55% for ‘No’ versus 45% for ‘Yes’ was strong, but the nationalist gene was out of the bottle and the constitutional question became the dominant fault line in Scottish politics.  

This piece is intended as a unionist call-to-arms (though I’ll admit it’s only likely to be read by a scoop full of people). Unionists, including English unionists like myself, need to start making the case for the union before it’s too late. And not just the economic case, though clearly this will be an important part of our argument, but the moral and emotional case as well. We should celebrate the success of the union.

Both England and Scotland have been at peace, and neither has suffered foreign invasion, since the Jacobite rising of 1745. It’s my view that the balance of probability is that this would not have been the case had Britain not been united. A united Britain allowed us, for better and worse, to transport our people, trade and way of life around the world whilst staying secure at home. It meant that when autocratic leaders sought to dominate the continent, from Napoleon to Hitler, we never had to fight them on British soil. British unity has been the foundation of our security for over 250 years, and consequently of our prosperity as well. If would be unwise to put this at risk without very good cause.

But the case for the union doesn’t just rest on security and prosperity, but on cultural compatibility and kinship as well. Put simply, whilst there are some cultural differences, the Scottish are objectively very similar to the English (and Welsh and Northern Irish). We speak the same language, eat the same food, watch the same TV, listen to the same music, have over 300 years of shared history and largely play the same sports. If two groups as objectively similar as the English and Scots can’t share a country, what chance is there of greater human unity ever being achieved? No Scottish nationalist has yet managed to explain to me how the interests of a bricklayer in Dundee are radically different from a scaffolder in Hull, and I expect they will struggle to do so. This isn’t humanist utopianism, I’m not calling for calling for a world Government, but I do think it would be astonishingly regressive if it turns out that the English and Scottish can’t share a state.

I have heard Scottish nationalists argue that, because of Brexit, things aren’t so clear cut. That rather than leaving a union, and adding to the fractures of humanity, they are merely exchanging the British union for the European one. But I’m afraid this doesn’t hold true. The EU is not remotely comparable with the UK. You can’t leave a full political-economic union, and join an incomplete political-economic union, and argue that you are doing anything other than strengthening the divisions in humanity. In any case the EU itself is starting to look a little shaky, and it’s perfectly possible that in the near future events (for example a Le Pen Presidency in France) will fundamentally alter its character or cause it to collapse.

Now I don’t want to make too much of economics, primarily because for me the benefits of the union can primarily be weighed in kinship/security rather than coin. And yet I feel I should mention it briefly. Scotland sells at least twice as much to other parts of the UK as to the rest of the world combined. If forced to choose between economic union with the UK and the EU, and I dearly wish the Scots hadn’t been put in a position where they might be compelled to, the UK option is far better from an economic perspective.

So to conclude, because of the EU referendum result the Brexit vote is once again in danger. And yet the case for the union, on cultural, security and economic grounds, remains overwhelming. Unionists can’t afford complacency, and we need to start making this case as assertively as we can. The battle of Europe is over. The battle of Britain is about to begin. 

When military inaction is murderous

We need to talk about a leader of the Labour Party, whose Middle Eastern policy has arguably contributed to many deaths and enormous suffering. I’m not thinking about Tony Blair, though the Iraq War was clearly a costly mistake. I’m thinking about Ed Miliband.  Probably the most significant thing Ed Miliband did, other than help the Conservative Party achieve a majority at the 2015 General Election, was to play a key role in blocking Western military intervention in Syria in 2013. This followed a number of chemical weapons attacks by the Assad regime, crossing Obama’s infamous ‘red line’. In response military action was planned by the US, France and Britain. Miliband, after some initial wavering, instructed his Labour MP’s to oppose the intervention, resulting in a Parliamentary defeat for the Government. This in turn caused the American Government to pause for thought, and then to negotiate with the Russian and Syrian Government to avoid intervention.

The deal was that the Syrian Government would hand over its chemical weapons, and in return America wouldn’t take military action. France, quite understandably, was unwilling to take action on her own. Now this wasn’t a total failure. Chemical weapons have only been used on a very small scale since the deal. But it has allowed the butchery to continue, and intensify, over the past three years.

The cost of non-intervention has been high, and probably greater than that of intervention. Just under 500,000 people have now been killed in the Syrian Civil War. In mid-2013 this figure was much lower, at just under 100,000. For all the media focus on the Islamic State and other Jihadi groups, understandably considering the threat they pose to the West, the majority of civilian deaths in Syria have been caused by the Assad regime and its allies. That’s not to say we should intervene now. Quite frankly since Russia began her military intervention to support Assad in September 2015 any Western action against Assad has become far too dangerous. Russia will be one of the key players in any solution to the Syrian conflict, and were going to have to accept that. But if the West had intervened in 2013 or before would the outcome have been different? Probably. It would have made it clear to the Assad regime, and its allies, that they couldn’t win outright. As such they would have had a strong incentive to negotiate with moderate rebel factions, who back in 2013 were considerably more potent than they are today.

Now if Western nations had intervened in 2013 thousands would still have died, and I suspect violence would be continuing on some scale to this day. But there’s good reason to think it wouldn’t have been on the same scale – something less than the outright slaughter house which were currently witnessing.

One of the curious things about the British left is how little they seem to care about Syrians dying in large numbers. They do admittedly care when Syrians drown trying to cross the Mediterranean, but when their getting barrel bombed in Aleppo or Damascus their interest vanishes like a thin mist on a summer’s day. Thousands of leftists took to the streets to oppose military action against the Islamic State in Syria last December. Their cry was ‘Don’t attack Syria’, which was odd considering that the Islamic State and Syria clearly aren’t the same thing. Labour MPs who supported this action received aggressive abuse from Corbyn’s supporters. Now I agree that MPs need to be held to account when they decide to commit our country to war, but they also need to be held to account when they decide to do nothing. The consequences can be just as dangerous. And that means that, just as Tony Blair has legitimate questions to answer over Iraq, so does Ed Miliband over Syria. 

Angela Merkel – the leader who revitalised Europe’s radical right

I’m writing this on Sunday 4 September, and it looks like a party from Europe’s populist right has just secured another victory. Early projections predict that Alternative for Germany (AfD), the anti-Euro party which transformed itself into an anti-immigration party, has beaten Merkel’s Christian Democrats in her home state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.  Not beaten them by much admittedly – it looks like 21 per cent to 19 per cent – but the symbolic value is enormous. A party of the hard-right has emerged as a serious player in German politics for the first time during the post-war era, and has defeated the Chancellor’s party in her native state. And the migration policy of the defeated Chancellor, Angela Merkel, bears a significant among of responsibility for this right-wing revival in Germany and other parts of Europe. It’s hard to imagine that, had she spent the past year being remote controlled by someone who wanted to see the likes of Marine Le-Pen and Norbert Hofer elected, her policy would have been much different.

Angela Merkel’s refugee policy was certainly bold, verging on revolutionary. It’s difficult not to admire her humanitarianism, nor to appreciate the quality of welcome which Syrian refugees received in Germany last year. But acts which are motivated by the best of human decency can have negative political impacts, and can be unwise. Germany took in over a million refugees, mostly Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans. Other European countries, most notably Austria and Sweden, took in similar or greater numbers as a proportion of their population. The political fallout has been significant, and generally negative. Europe’s more authoritarian leaders have seen their support increase. Orban in Hungary, and since October 2015 the Law and Justice Government of Poland, have boosted their support by opposing the resettlement of Syrian refugees in their respective countries. Turkey’s autocratic ruler President Erdogan secured significant concessions from the EU by blackmailing the body over migrant controls, whilst all Putin has to do is point Russian’s to the chaos in Central Europe to increase his own support.

For Europe’s radical right the refugee crisis, linked to the EU’s apparent inability to control its external borders, has been a Godsend. The Schengen area, the European free travel area, is only as secure as its weakest link. And its weakest link, Greece, has proven totally incapable of securing its borders. The initial refusal of certain key European leaders such as Merkel, European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker and the former Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann (who managed to offend both sides in a particularly undignified manner) to take serious action turned the situation into a crisis. Merkel’s famous shout of ‘Wir schaffen es’ (we can do this), and the initial pressure which was placed on countries such as Hungary to let refugees head North, turned the problem into a crisis.

Now it may seem unfair to blame Merkel and various other European liberal leaders for the migration crisis. And to some extend it is. Clearly they weren’t responsible for civil war in Syria or the conflict in Afghanistan (though most of liberal Europe has preferred to let the Syrian meat grinder continue than intervene directly). Moreover whatever else it was, and I think it was a lot of other things, Merkel’s refugee policy was inescapably well intentioned. But it was also extremely chaotic. For a long period virtually anybody from certain countries who managed to make their way to Germany could stay. This boosted the forces of nationalism and made people smugglers rich. But it also encouraged hundreds of thousands of refugees to attempt to cross the Mediterranean, and thousands died during the trip. Surely it would have been far more humane to take a smaller number of the most deserving cases straight from Turkey, rather than promoting a deadly free for all.

Now if the refugees were arriving in Germany and other European countries straight from a warzone the moral pressure to take in an unlimited number would be almost irresistible. But the refugees arriving in Germany last year had already passed through several safe countries. Would it not be better to focus on improving conditions in refugee camps in Turkey and Lebanon, rather than incentivising people to cross the sea in rickety boats with the inevitable tragic consequences? We should remember that kindness isn’t always compassionate.

And the impact of the fortunes of the European radical right has been phenomenal. Admittedly this has been a good time for them generally, as a result of Islamist terror and the still smouldering Euro crisis, and it’s very possible that the combination of these three factors will lead to a party of the radical right taking over either the Government and/or Presidency of a Western European state. In recent months the Dutch Freedom Party, Front National, Swedish Democrats and Austrian Freedom Party have all topped polls in their respective countries. Now these parties will struggle to find partners to join coalitions with them, and so are unlikely to achieve power in the short term. But if terrorist attacks continue, or the economic situations takes a bad turn for the worst, this could change.

More likely in the short-term in a radical-right victory in a Presidential election. At present the Austrian Freedom Party candidate, Norbert Hofer, is leading polls for the rerun Austrian Presidential election later this year. If Hofer does win it will be a direct result of the refugee policy pursued by certain European Governments in 2015-16. And it would also be a shot across the bow of liberal Europe. A Hofer Presidency would be embarrassing, but its political impact would be containable. A Le Pen Presidency in France in 2016, and I think this is quite plausible, would be utterly revolutionary for European politics.

So liberals, and I generally count myself in this category, need to wake up. We need to start listening to the voters on immigration and asylum policy, or we will be replaced by those that do. We need to be pragmatic, and stop fermenting chaos. And the stakes are high. If we fail systems of Government which we though had been banished to the dustbin of European history could plausibly make a return. We were shocked by Brexit, but what follows could be an earthquake.